For a D2C brand in India, physical retail works best when each store has one clear job and its halo effect on online sales is counted. That job is sales, discovery, trial, trust or reach; category, purchase frequency, repeat visits, return rates, segment and market decide which. ICSC's US data shows store openings usually lift nearby online sales too, so judge each store on its total contribution, not its till alone.
What role does a physical store play for a D2C brand?
The store is a role in the journey, not only a channel: sales, discovery, trial, trust or reach. Read properly, D2C is an omnichannel strategy that owns the consumer relationship across every channel. This paper separates total brand lift from a proven online halo.
Shoppers discover a brand on Instagram, try it in a mall, buy on the app and reorder through quick commerce.
Why are D2C brands in India opening offline stores?
D2C brands in India go offline for reach, cost and trust. Ecommerce is still under a tenth of Indian consumer spending, so most buying happens in stores.[14] In our view, many shoppers beyond the metros also trust a new brand more once they can see and try it.
Reach. BCG put India's ecommerce market at $120 to 140 billion in 2026, about 7 to 8% of consumer spending.[14] Accel, Fireside Ventures and Redseer expected about 90% of India's retail sales to stay offline in 2030.[15] NielsenIQ put traditional trade at about 82% of FMCG value in 2026.[16] The two measure different things: all retail sales against FMCG value by channel.
Cost. Trade press puts annual increases in customer acquisition cost for Indian D2C brands at 25 to 40%.[17] These are estimates, not audited figures.
Trust. For a new brand, a physical presence signals that it is real and will honour a return. That shift in brand perception matters most where fit, feel or quality are hard to judge online.
CBRE found that D2C brands took 18% of India's retail leasing in H1 2025, up from 8% in H1 2024. Fashion and apparel made up 60% of that D2C leasing.[3]
| Test | Question to answer | Signal that it passes |
|---|---|---|
| Reach | Are the next shoppers we need mostly offline? | Most category volume in target cities sells offline |
| Cost | Is the marginal online customer getting too expensive? | Store cost per new customer below marginal online CAC |
| Trust | Do shoppers hesitate because they cannot see or try? | Trial in store lifts conversion and lowers returns |
Source: Nextyn analysis.
What does D2C mean, and why does the definition matter?
A D2C brand sells directly to shoppers through its own website, app or stores, often alongside marketplaces and retailers. In the US the model is called DTC, and DTC brands such as Warby Parker and Allbirds set the early pattern of opening physical stores.
Because the definition varies, so do market sizes. McKinsey put India's D2C ecommerce channel at roughly $10 to 12 billion.[12] Inc42 called D2C an $80 billion industry in 2024.[13] One counts direct online sales, the other total sales.
- Phygital retail
- A blend of physical and digital in one shopping experience, such as an app that books an in-store test or a store that fulfils online orders.
- ROPO (research online, purchase offline)
- Shoppers researching online and then buying in a store; also called webrooming.
- Customer acquisition cost (CAC)
- The marketing and sales cost of winning one new customer. Marginal CAC is the cost of the next customer, not the average.
- Exclusive brand outlet (EBO)
- A store that sells only one brand's products, run by the brand or a franchisee.
- Same-pincode growth
- Same-store sales growth compares stores open in both periods. Same-pincode growth compares total revenue across a pincode, including new stores.
What is the halo effect of physical retail on online sales?
The halo effect is the lift a physical store gives a brand's online sales in the surrounding trade area. ICSC found in 2023 that opening a store lifted nearby online sales by 6.9% across all retailers over 13 weeks, and 13.9% for emerging DTC brands. Closing one cut them 11.5%.[1]
What did ICSC measure in 2018, 2019 and 2023?
ICSC measured web traffic in 2018, cross-channel spending in 2019 and trade-area card sales in 2023. The 2018 study covered 804 store openings and closures in 145 US markets. Opening a store lifted the brand's overall web traffic by an average of 37%.[4]
In 2019 ICSC tracked spending across channels within 15 days. A shopper who spent $100 in a store went on to spend an average of $167 more online. Each $100 spent online led to $131 more in store.[1]
In Halo Effect III, published in 2023, ICSC and Alexander Babbage analysed $848.1 billion of card spending by zip code. It covered 69 retailers and 2,103 stores that opened or closed across the US from 2019 to 2022.[1]
| Measure | All retailers | Established | Emerging DTC |
|---|---|---|---|
| Online sales after a store opens | +6.9% | +6.8% | +13.9% |
| Online sales after a store closes | −11.5% | −11.6% | −5.2% |
| Average online basket, before and after opening | n/a | $94 to $104 | $111 to $120 |
| Average online basket, before and after closing | n/a | $91 to $91 | $126 to $109 |
Source: ICSC, Halo Effect III (2023).[1] The study is correlational, not a controlled experiment.
Halo effect by category: do physical stores increase ecommerce sales?
On average, yes, but category matters more than the average. After an opening, apparel's trade-area online sales rose 11.6%. Cosmetics was the one category where online sales fell, by 4.6%, as some buying moved into the new store, though combined cosmetics spending still rose.[1]
Apparel brands growing their store count saw more than twice the online lift from an opening than brands shrinking their estate.[1]
What happens to online sales when a store closes?
Online sales near the store usually fall, and established retailers lose more than emerging DTC brands. Established retailers' trade-area online sales fell 11.6% after a closure, and apparel's 19.4%. Apparel brands shrinking their estate lost twice as much online as brands still expanding.[1]
For established retailers, then, a closure costs more online than an opening adds. For emerging DTC brands the pattern reverses: the closure loss was smaller than the opening gain, and showed mainly in the basket.[1]
Do DTC store rollouts prove an online halo?
Not on their own. Warby Parker's store count rose while ecommerce revenue barely moved.[5] Allbirds drew store visits while revenue fell.[7] Glossier's lift came through Sephora, total brand lift rather than an online halo.[8] Flat ecommerce does not prove stores had no online effect.
From FY2020 to FY2025 Warby Parker's stores rose from 126 to 323 and ecommerce revenue from $237.4 million to $240.9 million.[5] It reported its first full year of net profit in 2025.[6] For eyewear the store's main job is sales and service.
Allbirds' store visits peaked in 2023 at 407.1% above 2021 levels, while net revenue fell to 45.1% below 2021 levels by 2025. Placer.ai's explanation is purchase frequency: Allbirds sold a narrow, low-frequency range.[7]
Glossier said its 2023 Sephora launch produced more than $100 million in retail sales that year.[8] Marketplace sales later rose 80%, its chief executive said in June 2025.[9] Yet in March 2026 it said it would close nine of its twelve own stores.[10] Puck later reported Sephora cutting its shelf space by up to half, from one source only.[11]
| Rung | What the claim shows | Example in this paper |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Total brand lift | Brand sales rose after entering retail | Glossier after Sephora |
| 2. Channel shift | Stores grew while online held flat or fell | Warby Parker FY2020 to FY2025 |
| 3. Digital-to-store influence | Online engagement precedes store purchase | Lenskart, FirstCry |
| 4. Trade-area online lift | Online sales near a store move with store events | ICSC Halo Effect III |
| 5. Causal online halo | Online lift versus matched areas without a store | Rarely published; run it yourself |
Source: Nextyn analysis.
D2C offline retail strategy in India: how have top brands gone offline?
Top D2C brands in India have taken very different offline routes. Lenskart went through owned stores and eye tests, FirstCry through owned and franchise stores and Snitch through exclusive brand outlets. Honasa chose general-trade distribution and boAt multi-brand retail. Each route reflects the store's role in that category.
| Brand | Offline model | What the numbers show | Main role of the store |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lenskart | Owned and franchise stores, app, home try-on | 3,327 stores worldwide at FY26 end, 542 added in India[2] | Trial, eye test, service, trust |
| FirstCry | Company-owned and franchise modern stores | 22% of India multichannel GMV from stores; ~45% of stores company owned[18] | Trust and cross-channel loyalty |
| Snitch | Exclusive brand outlets | FY26 revenue ₹900 crore; offline about 40%, 115 stores[19] | Sales and discovery |
| boAt | Multi-brand retail and distributors | Offline 29.45% of FY25 revenue, through over 12,000 offline retailers[20] | Availability and reach |
| Honasa (Mamaearth) | Direct general-trade distribution | Direct distributors' share of Honasa's business, 38% to 71%, Q4 FY24 to Q4 FY25[21] | Reach into general trade |
| BlueStone | Owned and franchise jewellery stores | 275 stores; offline 93.3% of FY25 revenue[22] | Trust for a high-ticket purchase |
| Licious | Own stores plus an acquired chain | 50+ stores; offline over a third of online sales in September 2025 (₹32 crore vs ₹90 crore)[23] | Freshness proof and reach |
| Wakefit | Own outlets, adding company-owned stores | 98 outlets, plan to reach 216[24] | Trial of mattresses and furniture |
| Sugar Cosmetics | Exclusive stores, kiosks, multi-brand outlets | Reportedly shut 30 to 40% of newly opened stores[25] | Discovery, now rebalanced |
How does Lenskart's phygital retail model work?
Lenskart's phygital model works by making each store more than a shop. Each is a place to try frames, get an eye test, pick up an online order or have glasses serviced.[2] In FY26 it added 603 stores, 542 in India and 254 of those in Tier 2 and smaller cities, and ran 23.8 million eye tests.[2]
About 50% of FY26 India revenue was digitally influenced (customers who engaged digitally in the 90 days before buying).[2] The app and search feed the stores, a path-to-purchase pattern called research online, purchase offline, or ROPO.[2] Same-pincode growth was 27.3% in FY26 against 20.8% same-store sales growth. Lenskart reads the gap as new stores adding demand; its definition does not say whether online orders are included.[2] It reports payback under 12 months for early Tier 2 and smaller-city cohorts.[2]
FirstCry, Honasa and Sugar: three other routes
FirstCry's FY25 earnings call gives a rare Indian measure of cross-channel shopping behaviour. In its top 20 cities, about 38% of GMV came from customers who buy both ways.[18]
Honasa billed 1.2 lakh unique outlets in FY25.[21] General trade gives reach no store network can match, but it runs on distributor margins, credit and beat plans.
Sugar Cosmetics shows the other side: BW Retail World, citing The Economic Times, reported in 2026 that it shut 30 to 40% of newly opened stores for store-level losses.[25] Beauty still works offline: Nykaa ran 313 stores in 99 cities at FY26 end.[26] The lesson is that a brand's own store must earn its rent or carry a measured halo.
DTC strategy decision tree: what role should the store play?
A D2C brand should go offline when the store passes a clear test. It reaches shoppers online cannot, acquires them more cheaply, or builds trust that lifts every channel. Name the store's role first: sales, discovery, trial, trust or reach. Category, purchase frequency, repeat visits, return rates, shopper segment and market decide which.
| Factor | Question | If yes, it suggests |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Category | Does purchase need fit, feel, a test or a service (eyewear, mattresses, jewellery, fragrance)? | Trial role; EBO, experience store or shop-in-shop with trained staff |
| 2. Purchase frequency | Is it bought monthly or more often (personal care, food, baby care)? | Reach role; modern trade, general trade, quick commerce |
| 3. Repeat visits | Does a frequently refreshed range bring shoppers back to buy without needing trial (fast fashion with frequent drops)? | Sales role; EBOs in sites where each store can earn its rent |
| 4. Return rates | Are online returns high because of size, colour or fit (apparel, footwear)? | Trial role; stores that cut returns and convert browsers |
| 5. Segment | Are the next shoppers in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, or new to the category? | Trust role; visible stores, franchise or partner shelves in those cities |
| 6. Market | Is awareness low outside early adopters, or is the brand entering a new country? | Discovery role; shop-in-shop, retail partnerships, pop-ups |
Source: Nextyn analysis.
Should a D2C brand go offline, and when?
A D2C brand is ready to go offline when three things are true. It has proven repeat purchase online, a clear role for the store from the decision tree, and the capacity to run inventory across more than one channel. Timing usually follows rising marginal acquisition cost.
Exclusive brand outlet vs shop-in-shop, modern trade or general trade: which should a D2C brand choose?
Choose exclusive brand outlets (EBOs) when trial, service or a broad, frequently refreshed range drives purchase, and each store can earn its rent. Choose shop-in-shop for discovery and trial in high-footfall sites. Choose modern trade for planned or repeat purchases that shoppers compare on shelf. Choose general trade for low-ticket, frequent purchases that need reach beyond the metros.
In a company-owned, company-operated (COCO) store, the brand carries a fixed, front-loaded cost. In a franchise-owned, franchise-operated (FOFO) store, the partner invests and shares the margin. Shop-in-shop and retail partnerships give credibility and reach for a share of margin.
Modern trade shelf execution needs a regular retail audit. A pop-up store runs for days or weeks: the cheapest way to test a city or mall before a lease.
Direct-to-consumer vs wholesale: which should a D2C brand choose?
The direct-to-consumer vs wholesale debate is usually framed as margin against reach. Direct sales keep the margin and the data; wholesale gives scale and credibility for less of both. Most growing brands run both within an omnichannel retail strategy.
Lenskart's 8.8 million active Gold members tie store and online buying together.[2]
How do you measure the halo effect of a physical store?
To measure the halo, compare a store's trade-area online sales and basket size for 13 weeks after opening with the period before, as ICSC did.[1] Then add matched areas without a store, because stores usually open where the brand is already strongest. Add new-customer value and the store's own profit: that total is its contribution.
Most D2C brands already hold the data to measure it: order data with pincodes. Leave out two weeks either side of the opening, as ICSC did, and extend to 26 or 52 weeks to see whether the halo lasts.[1]
Setting up a halo measurement in the first ten stores
- Fix trade areas by pincode and record matched control areas before the first store opens.
- Capture a customer identifier at the store till so purchases link across channels.
- Report the store contribution scorecard quarterly alongside the store profit and loss account.
| Component | How to measure | Data needed |
|---|---|---|
| Store contribution margin | Store sales less product cost, rent, staff and running costs | Store profit and loss account |
| Trade-area online lift | Change in online sales in the trade area against matched control areas | Orders by pincode, control areas |
| New-customer value | New-to-brand customers attributed to the store, times expected lifetime margin | Customer IDs across channels, repeat curves |
| Channel shift | Online customers who moved to buying in store, netted off | Matched customer histories |
| Returns and service | Change in return rates and service costs for nearby customers | Returns by pincode and channel |
Source: Nextyn analysis.
Illustrative example: a D2C personal-care brand chooses its first store format
For a fictional brand selling face and body care, the decision tree points to discovery and trial, and shop-in-shop counters win. Prospects hesitate because they cannot test texture or fragrance.
Face care signals trial, Tier 2 shoppers signal trust and low awareness signals discovery; trial is also how the store builds trust. Its three options:
- A. Six exclusive brand outlets in two metros: about ₹2 crore upfront.
- B. 40 shop-in-shop counters in four metros and four Tier 2 cities: about ₹0.6 crore.
- C. Modern trade in 250 stores in one region: about ₹0.5 crore.
Against a discovery and trial role, option B scores best. It costs under a third of option A. It puts testers and trained advisors in front of high-intent shoppers. Option C delivers reach with little trial; it suits the year-two goal for body care, the line bought monthly.
How this paper was built
This paper draws on public sources published between 2018 and November 2026: industry studies, consulting and real-estate research, company filings, shareholder letters, earnings call transcripts and trade press. Figures are quoted as published and have not been independently audited.
Frequently asked questions about D2C brands and physical retail
Sources: the 27 public sources behind the full report
- 01
ICSC (2023). Halo Effect III: Where the halo shines, how physical stores drive online sales. Includes recap of ICSC's 2019 cross channel spending study.
https://www.icsc.com/uploads/about/ICSC_Halo_Effect_III_Report.pdf - 02
Lenskart (2026). Shareholder letter, Q4 and full year FY26 results.
https://assets.lenskart.com/documents/2026/05/20/ShareholderResult-Q4-2026.pdf - 03
CBRE (2025). India's D2C revolution: the new retail order; Realty n More (2025), coverage of the CBRE report.
https://www.cbre.co.in/insights/reports/india-s-d2c-revolution-the-new-retail-order
https://realtynmore.com/share-of-retail-leasing-by-d2c-brands-more-than-doubles-to-18-per-cent-in-h1-2025-says-cbre-report/ - 04
ICSC (2018). ICSC Halo Effect study finds physical stores drive increase in online traffic.
https://www.icsc.com/news-and-views/icsc-exchange/icsc-halo-effect-study-finds-physical-stores-drive-increase-in-online-traff - 05
EightX (2026). Warby Parker's 10K: what retail really costs a DTC brand.
https://eightx.co/blog/warby-parker-retail-margin-drag - 06
Chain Store Age (2026). Warby Parker posts first full year net income, plans 50 stores in 2026.
https://chainstoreage.com/warby-parker-posts-first-full-year-net-income-profit-plans-50-stores-2026 - 07
Placer.ai (2026). A DNB lesson: why Warby Parker's physical stores worked and Allbirds' did not.
https://www.placer.ai/anchor/articles/a-dnb-lesson-why-warby-parkers-physical-stores-worked-and-allbirds-didnt - 08
Fast Company (2024). Glossier CEO Kyle Leahy on profitability; FashionUnited (2023). Glossier enters third party retail for first time via Sephora.
https://www.fastcompany.com/91202923/glossier-ceo-kyle-leahy-profitable
https://fashionunited.uk/news/retail/glossier-enters-third-party-retail-for-first-time-via-sephora/2023022868156 - 09
Retail TouchPoints (2025). Glossier CEO Kyle Leahy to step down; update: Glossier names Colin Walsh as new CEO.
https://www.retailtouchpoints.com/news/glossier-ceo-kyle-leahy-to-step-down-search-for-a-successor-begins/152780/ - 10
Cosmetics Business (2026). Why Glossier is in need of a major reset; AOL (2026). Beloved beauty brand closing most of its stores.
https://cosmeticsbusiness.com/glossier-major-reset-close-shops-job-cuts-reduce-products
https://www.aol.com/articles/beloved-beauty-brand-closing-most-191531749.html - 11
Puck (2026). What happened to Glossier a year into its turnaround. Single source, paywalled.
https://puck.news/fashion/2026/11/what-happened-to-glossier-a-year-into-its-turnaround - 12
YourStory (2025). Next wave of D2C: how tech, data and consumer shifts are redefining growth, citing McKinsey.
https://yourstory.com/2025/06/next-wave-d2c-how-tech-data-consumer-shifts-redefining-growth - 13
Inc42 (2025). India's $100 Bn D2C gold rush and the forces driving it.
https://inc42.com/resources/indias-100-bn-d2c-gold-rush-and-the-forces-driving-it - 14
BCG (2026). $300 Billion Connected Commerce: how clicks and bricks are defining the future of India's ecommerce; Free Press Journal (2026), coverage of the report.
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2026/india-clicks-and-bricks-are-defining-the-future-of-e-commerce
https://www.freepressjournal.in/tech/indias-ecommerce-market-to-hit-300-billion-by-2030-offline-retail-holds-strong - 15
Redseer Strategy Consultants with Accel and Fireside Ventures (2024). Decoding omnichannel: strategies for D2C brands; Fibre2Fashion (2024), Indian retail to cross $2.2 trn by 2030, 90% of sales offline.
https://redseer.com/reports/decoding-omnichannel-strategies-for-d2c-brands/
https://www.fibre2fashion.com/news/retail-results/indian-retail-to-cross-2-2-trn-by-2030-90-of-sales-offline-report-295245-newsdetails.htm - 16
NielsenIQ (2026). India FMCG Quarterly Snapshot, Q2 2026.
https://nielseniq.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/08/NIQ-India-FMCG-Quarterly-Snapshot_Q226-AMJ26.pdf - 17
Entrepreneur India and StartupTalky (2025), on D2C acquisition costs and offline expansion. Trade press estimates.
https://startuptalky.com/india-d2c-brands-opening-physical-stores - 18
FirstCry, Brainbees (2025). Q4 FY25 earnings conference call transcript.
https://files.tijorifinance.com/insight/india/57788/Conference%20Call/CC-Mar25.pdf - 19
Outlook Business (2026). Snitch FY26 revenue jumps 80% to ₹900 crore, brand hits profitability; Inc42 (2026).
https://www.outlookbusiness.com/corporate/snitch-fy26-revenue-jumps-80-to-900-cr-brand-hits-profitability
https://inc42.com/buzz/d2c-brand-snitchs-fy26-revenue-surges-80-to-%e2%82%b9900-cr/ - 20
Outlook Business (2025). boAt parent Imagine Marketing files updated DRHP.
https://www.outlookbusiness.com/news/boat-parent-imagine-marketing-files-updated-drhp-for-1500-cr-ipo - 21
Inc42 (2025). Mamaearth Q4: profit falls 18% to INR 25 Cr; Inc42 (2025). Honasa's 2025: becoming more than Mamaearth.
https://inc42.com/buzz/mamaearth-q4-profit-falls-18-to-inr-25-cr
https://inc42.com/features/honasas-2025-becoming-more-than-mamaearth - 22
Inc42 (2025). BlueStone sees FY25 losses soar 56% on offline push, citing its red herring prospectus.
https://inc42.com/buzz/bluestone-sees-fy25-losses-soar-56-on-offline-push - 23
D2C Insider Pulse (2025). Licious eyes 80 stores by year end as offline revenue approaches one third of online business.
https://pulse.d2cinsider.com/licious-eyes-80-stores-by-year-end-as-offline-revenue-approaches-one-third-of-online-business/ - 24
Outlook Business (2025). Wakefit's IPO playbook: what the DRHP reveals.
https://www.outlookbusiness.com/markets/wakefits-ipo-playbook-what-drhp-reveals-about-growth-investor-moves-and-key-risks - 25
BW Retail World (2026). Sugar Cosmetics raises ₹144.47 crore at up to 80% lower valuation, citing The Economic Times; Storyboard18 (2025). Sugar Cosmetics FY25 results.
https://bwretailworld.com/beauty/cosmetics-skin-care/sugar-cosmetics-raises-rs-144-47-cr-at-up-to-80-lower-valuation
https://storyboard18.com/brand-marketing/sugar-cosmetics-profitability-slips-as-fy25-revenue-declines-to-rs-415-crore-82535.htm - 26
INDmoney (2026). Nykaa Q4 FY26 results analysis.
https://www.indmoney.com/blog/stocks/nykaa-q4-results-analysis - 27
Apparel Resources (2022). Shoppers Stop partners GOAT Brand Labs.
https://apparelresources.com/business-news/retail/shoppers-stop-partners-goat-brand-labs
Figures are quoted as published, with their year. Where sources disagree or a figure appears in a single source, the text says so. Company figures from filings, earnings calls and press reports cover different periods and have not been independently audited by Nextyn.
The worked example is illustrative: the brand is fictional and every number is an assumption, not data from any company or a market benchmark.
Brand examples are drawn from public information and are not Nextyn clients unless stated.
Hero photograph: Rachel Claire / Pexels.